Effectiveness and Impact of UNDP Mine Action Support: Lessons Learned by Downs, Charles & Fox, Alan
Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction 
Volume 20 
Issue 3 The Journal of Conventional Weapons 
Destruction 
Article 10 
November 2016 
Effectiveness and Impact of UNDP Mine Action Support: Lessons 
Learned 
Charles Downs 
Downs Consulting 
Alan Fox 
UNDP Independent Evaluation Office 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-journal 
 Part of the Defense and Security Studies Commons, Emergency and Disaster Management Commons, 
Other Public Affairs, Public Policy and Public Administration Commons, and the Peace and Conflict 
Studies Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Downs, Charles and Fox, Alan (2016) "Effectiveness and Impact of UNDP Mine Action Support: Lessons 
Learned," Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction: Vol. 20 : Iss. 3 , Article 10. 
Available at: https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-journal/vol20/iss3/10 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Center for International Stabilization and Recovery at 
JMU Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction by an 
authorized editor of JMU Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact dc_admin@jmu.edu. 
Field Notes
45ISSUE 20.3 @ NOVEMBER 2016
 Effectiveness and Impact of UNDP  
 Mine Action Support: Lessons Learned
by Charles Downs [ Consultant ] and Alan Fox [ UNDP Independent Evaluation Office ]
The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has supported mine action in more than 40 countries 
since its first involvement in Cambodia in 1992. UNDP sup-
port generally focuses on the development of national mine 
action management capacities. In early 2016, the Independent 
Evaluation Office (IEO) of UNDP concluded the first global 
evaluation of the results of UNDP support in mine action, 
with particular attention to its effectiveness and impact.1 The 
evaluation reviewed documentation relating to all national, 
UNDP-supported mine action programs, in-depth desk re-
views of support to 14 countries, and background for field case 
studies of three national programs (Laos, Mozambique, and 
Tajikistan). It also included visits to two dozen communities 
in Laos (n=8), Mozambique (n=11), and Tajikistan (n=5)—all 
of which were previously mine-affected and where demining 
had occurred at least five years before the evaluation visit. The 
evaluation highlighted several important lessons regarding ef-
fectiveness of international support in mine action and pro-
vided important nuances to the discussion of impact in mine 
action. UNDP management accepted the recommendations 
addressed to it.2
Origin and Development of UNDP  
 Mine Action Support
Modern mine action began with the U.N. decision in late 
1988 to train and equip Afghans living in refugee settlements 
in Pakistan to return to their country to clear landmines. In 
1989, a U.N. coordination office was established to oversee 
the process, with national nongovernmental organizations 
(NGO) as the main operators; The HALO Trust was estab-
lished as the first mine action international NGO (INGO). In 
2002, the Afghanistan program was transferred to the United 
Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) for implementation 
by the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS). 
Globally, the next mine action programs were established in 
Kuwait (1991) for clearance after the First Gulf War and in 
Central America (1992) for clearance of minefields resulting 
from internal conflicts. The former was conducted on a com-
mercial basis and financed by the Kuwait government, and the 
Organization of American States in cooperation with nation-
al armed forces supported the latter. UNDP was not involved 
with any of these mine action programs.
Initial UNDP involvement in mine action was a corollary 
of U.N. peacekeeping missions during the first half of the 
1990s (Cambodia, 1992; Mozambique, 1993; Angola, 1994). 
In these cases, peacekeeping missions were contracted for de-
mining services (i.e., road access, resettlement areas, etc.) and 
to train local personnel as deminers. These missions did not 
have a mechanism to continue financing or employing trained 
teams beyond the life of the mission, and looked to UNDP 
to recruit deminers and channel funding. In each country, 
UNDP established specific projects and organizations for 
this purpose—managed by UNOPS, which has continued 
to implement those projects for UNDP since 1995. UNDP 
gained further experience on a country-by-country basis in 
Laos (1995), as well as with the peacekeeping missions for 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia in the mid-1990s. On 
the groundwork of an important multicountry study in 1997, 
the maturing international mine action community conclud-
ed that the national mine action center should not be an op-
erator to minimize the labor and budgetary implications—as 
well as potential conflicts of interest in allocation of funds—
and to insulate the national (or international) authority from 
liabilities.3 Other major NGOs that would have a global role 
in mine action joined The HALO Trust in the early 1990s: 
MAG (Mines Advisory Group), Handicap International (HI), 
and Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA).
International civil society’s reaction to the lasting effects 
of landmine contamination in the aforementioned coun-
tries led to the 1997 adoption of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban 
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Convention (APMBC), transforming international mine ac-
tion. First, it established an obligation for each mine-affected 
State Party to remove all known minefields from its territory, 
as well as a provision that each State Party in a position to do 
so would provide assistance for such efforts. Although the im-
plication was not immediately clear to all, this implied a long-
term effort to clear every mine rather than simply make each 
country safe. Second, the United Nations, NGOs, and com-
mercial demining firms understood that international mine 
action would continue for many years, and that they should 
organize themselves accordingly. UNMAS and the dedicated 
mine action units of UNDP, UNOPS, and UNICEF were es-
tablished during this period, as was the Geneva International 
Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD). The 
International Mine Action Standards (IMAS), the dedicated 
Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA), 
and the institutional model of separating the national mine 
action entity for operational management from that of policy, 
as well as separating both from field operations, are all from 
this period. During the first years of the APMBC until the 
First Review Conference in 2004, most countries with histor-
ic mine problems established national UNDP-supported pro-
grams with the exception of those coming out of immediate 
conflicts, which more often had UNMAS-managed programs.
Initially it was expected that UNMAS would have opera-
tional responsibility for peacekeeping mine action programs, 
which UNOPS would implement to provide continuity, then 
hand over to UNDP as each program’s mission ended. This 
changed for several reasons:
1 . There were delays in UNDP picking up some national 
programs.
2. UNMAS staff believed they were more effective at re-
sponding to mine problems than UNDP or national 
bureaucracies.
3. UNMAS involvement typically was accompanied by much 
greater donor resources than those UNDP could attract.
Community maps in Mozambique showing contamination drawn by women.
Photo courtesy of UNDP/Rebecca Roberts.
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An effective UNMAS program during this period was 
in Kosovo (1999–2001), in which the U.N. Mine Action 
Coordination Center coordinated the technical response and 
resources to largely resolve the mine problem without the na-
tional government. The international staff of UNDP mine ac-
tion support projects sometimes had to unlearn lessons from 
Kosovo in order to become mine action advisers rather than 
mine action managers to focus on developing national capaci-
ties to manage the respective mine action program.
National Ownership
Distinguishing the development of national ownership 
from the development of technical management capacity is 
important. UNDP has generally been successful in support-
ing institutionalization of national ownership—which is more 
comprehensive than developing national technical capacity—
and projects staffed and managed by nationals. National own-
ership is a question of government commitment rather than 
of staff passports. The evaluation identified a few essential as-
pects of national ownership:
* Formal establishment of the national mine action entity
* Inclusion of the national mine action entity in the regu-
lar government budget
* Inclusion of mine action in the national recovery and 
development plan
* Adherence to key relevant treaties (e.g., APMBC)
UNDP is particularly capable of developing a formal, in-
stitutional framework for mine action. Institutional support 
and capacity building are aspects of most mine action support 
programs and are commonly carried out by GICHD, UNDP, 
United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), UNMAS, bilater-
al donors, and also NGOs in some cases. However, in peace-
keeping contexts, the presence of UNMAS is generally due to a 
breakdown in government capacity, and it acts in substitution 
of government with that role somewhat begrudgingly accept-
ed. Governments do not change institutional structures to fit 
Community maps in Mozambique showing contamination drawn by men.
Photo courtesy of UNDP/Rebecca Roberts.
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the needs of a peacekeeping mission, which is generally con-
sidered to be an infringement of national sovereignty.
UNDP has not been universally successful in develop-
ing government ownership. In some cases—including Laos, 
Mozambique, and Tajikistan—the national mine action entity 
continued for more than a decade as a UNDP project with-
out proper institutionalization or inclusion in the national 
budget. Although conducted in agreement between the gov-
ernment, UNDP, and some donors, such situations delayed es-
sential actions for long-term sustainability and created donor 
doubt regarding national commitment.
Support and Development of National   
 Mine Action Management Capacity
Based on lessons learned in the late 1990s, the evaluation 
team identified the key management capacities that the na-
tional mine action center requires as information manage-
ment, strategic planning, quality management of operations, 
and resource mobilization. Expertise in each area can be de-
veloped through specific training and experience. However, 
trained personnel may not remain in the national entity once 
the international project ends.
UNDP’s comparative advantage in institutional develop-
ment is seen by many as not carrying over to the technical 
side of demining. Close working partners supplied much of 
the specific technical support provided under the UNDP um-
brella. In the early years of UNDP mine action, UNOPS sup-
ported the implementation services and developed rosters of 
experts and suppliers. One or more NGOs or specialized firms 
then provided operational support for demining. GICHD 
supports operational policy development in many countries, 
and its advisers continue providing mine action expertise to 
governments supported by UNDP. The ad hoc relationship 
with GICHD has been particularly valuable, whereby GICHD 
provides technical expertise and relies on UNDP for country-
level access, support, and coordinated follow-up.
Information Management
Quality of data and reporting is vital to the credibility of 
the national mine action program. All mine action programs 
and operators endeavor to maintain good records of the dem-
ining work conducted and areas of suspected contamination. 
In the past, personnel used a simple spreadsheet or database, 
but complexity grew as the amount of data increased with 
1988–1997 1998–2004 2005–present
UN-Managed UNDP UN-Managed UNDP UN-Managed UNDP
Afganistan
Angola
Bosnia
Croatia
Mozambique
Northern Iraq
Angola
Bosnia
Cambodia
Lao PDR
Mozambique
Burundi
Cyprus
DR Congo
Iraq
Kosovo
Lebanon
Sudan
UNMEE
W. Sahara
Afghanistan
Albania
(Armenia)
Azerbaijan
Bosnia
Chad
Colombia
Croatia
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Guinea-Bissau
(Iran)
Iraq
Jordan
Lebanon
Mauritania
Senegal
Somalia
Sri Lanka
Tajikistan
Thailand
(Ukraine)
Yemen
CAR
Chad
Colombia
Cote d’Ivoire
Darfur
Liberia
Libya
Mali
Nepal
OPT
Somalia
South Sudan
Algeria
Burundi
(Cyprus)
(Egypt)
(Liberia)
(Libya)
(Malawi)
(Pakistan)
(Rep. of Congo)
(Sudan)
(Uganda)
Vietnam
(Zambia)
(Zimbabwe)
Note: (Country) = Limited UNDP Support
Table 1. Initiation of UN-managed and UNDP-supported mine action programs. 
Figure courtesy of the authors.
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surveys of suspected hazardous areas (SHA), as well as with 
the introduction of GIS and mapping capabilities. Database 
and mapping tools developed during the 1990s due to the 
need to record the entirety of the landmine problem and the 
detail of site-specific operational work—with GICHD estab-
lishing the IMSMA for UNMAS. In many cases, IMSMA 
was installed in parallel with conducting a Landmine Impact 
Survey (LIS), although some existing programs were reluctant 
to replace their own database systems with IMSMA.4 GICHD 
provided the IMSMA software and training free of charge to 
mine action programs. As efforts were made to improve tech-
nical skills, IMSMA was used as the basis for strategic plan-
ning in response to the overall mine and explosive remnants 
of war (ERW) problem.
Development of information-management systems with-
in government structures has been an especially difficult 
capacity-development challenge in many countries due to 
the difficulty of retaining qualified staff. The data quality 
and management of the system improved over time but was 
frequently interrupted by the loss of qualified personnel to 
better paying, private-sector career opportunities. These po-
sitions often received salary top-ups, and new technical per-
sonnel required fresh training on a continual basis. GICHD 
primarily provided technical support, with donor financing 
through UNDP. A continued need for technical and finan-
cial support for information management is likely, even with 
a well-established national mine action management entity. 
This is a long-term global challenge to maintain the special-
ized capacity required for mine action centers.
Lastly, in many programs when information-management 
systems were upgraded or a new baseline survey was conduct-
ed, previous data sets were set aside. For example, the 2015 
mine action database in Mozambique goes back to 2008, miss-
ing the information for demining conducted during the first 
15 years of the national program.  This greatly reduces its use-
fulness for long-term development and land-use planning, for 
which it would be valuable as a georeferenced data set simi-
lar to ones for hazardous waste and other environmental con-
tamination, flood plains, and earthquake hazards.
Strategic Planning and Prioritiz ation
The global mine action community recognizes the value of 
strategic planning as an essential element of effective nation-
al mine action programs. Previously, programs with annual 
operational plans began to develop strategies that assessed 
the known extent of the problem, considered the level of op-
erational activities necessary to resolve it, and projected the 
financial resources required to complete the task on time. 
The first plans were often produced with considerable input 
by international advisers, and in many cases, funded through 
UNDP. Over time, with more experience and better infor-
mation, later strategic plans were more realistic and included 
wider national and local participation. The process of prepar-
ing APMBC Article 5 extension requests has been an impor-
tant impetus to strengthen the quality and realism of national 
mine action plans.
Prioritization of land clearance tasks was a vital component 
of strategic planning. During the initial periods of peacekeep-
ing and humanitarian emergency programs, high-priority 
tasks were easy to discern, and less emphasis was placed on 
assessing the relative importance of second-tier sites for clear-
ance. Once emergency tasks were resolved, a large number of 
competing priorities with which to contend remained, bring-
ing increased importance to prioritization. However, there 
was little practical guidance:
* The APMBC set clearance deadlines but provided no 
prioritization.
* UNMAS published a suggested set of general priori-
ties in 1998 that included emergency assistance; set-
tled land with high civilian casualties; land required 
for resettlement of IDPs and refugees; land required 
for agriculture; community development; access to free 
operation of health services; and reconstruction and 
infrastructure.5
* Demining operators sought to maximize the efficiency 
of their teams and equipment, and prioritized factors 
such as physical and seasonal access as well as suitabil-
ity of minefields for available demining assets (climate, 
vegetation, topography, and nature of the landmine/
ERW contamination). For operators, safety and ease of 
use took precedence over the impact on beneficiary use 
of the land.
Landmine Impact Surveys and  
 Evidence-based Priority Setting
The introduction of LIS in the late 1990s was a deliberate 
effort to shift the practice of setting priorities based on mine-
field characteristics and operator capabilities to focusing on 
communities with socioeconomic problems caused by sus-
pected mined areas. UNDP (together with UNMAS, UNOPS, 
and the Survey Working Group) was an early promoter of LIS 
as a means to obtain more complete information, not only of 
suspected mined areas, but also of their socioeconomic im-
pacts on affected communities. LIS was carried out in heavily 
5
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A woman cultivates vegetables for consumption 
and market under Pylon 183.
Photo courtesy of UNDP/Rebecca Roberts.
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mine-affected countries between 1999 and 2006. LIS and oth-
er impact-assessment tools were introduced to ensure that as-
sets would have the greatest positive result for mine-affected 
communities. LIS increased the socioeconomic benefit of de-
mining by focusing greater demining resources on resolution 
of community problems. This was done at the expense of re-
ducing its operational efficiency by increasing the estimated 
size of SHAs for demining and increasing the frequency with 
which demining teams moved to address higher impact areas. 
While UNDP focused particular attention to higher socio- 
economic impact areas, national governments sought demin-
ing support for infrastructure, regardless of the level of exist-
ing local socioeconomic impact.
Experience has confirmed the merits of a two-tier approach 
to priority-setting for demining, with national prioritization 
at the broad category level of blocked resources (roads, mar-
kets, water ways, farmland), coupled with the selection of spe-
cific tasks based on local needs. UNDP-supported planning 
processes have in some cases overemphasized local priorities, 
with insufficient hazard evidence. To avoid this risk, the first 
operational response should be precise surveying rather than 
clearance. As evidence-based approaches to priority setting 
were applied in different countries, they resulted in increased 
numbers of mines removed per hectare cleared and a reduc-
tion in the percentage of tasks where no mines were found. 
This approach was advocated for some years by GICHD, 
UNDP, UNMAS, UNOPS, NGOs, and with the support of do-
nors. Over time, most programs developed a combined meth-
odology for priority setting—partly impact, partly technical, 
and partly prioritization by local authorities.
National Mine Action Standards  
 and Quality Management
National mine action standards (NMAS) form a critical 
part of the quality-management process, together with the 
operator-accreditation process, and the verification of cleared 
land. In countries where it has helped establish mine action 
programs, UNDP has supported the issuance of NMAS to 
guide the management and implementation process. In most 
countries the first NMAS were developed by an internation-
al technical adviser, who essentially adapted the IMAS (since 
2001) or other existing mine action program standards (be-
fore 2001) to the country in question. The resulting first stan-
dards were nearly always in English. Over time NMAS were 
revised and translated into national languages. Some revi-
sions consider national experience, although changes to glob-
al IMAS continue to drive most countries’ revisions.
UNDP Support of and Impact on Mine Action
During the evaluation-inception phase, the team identi-
fied possible impacts from demining on local communities: 
improvements in household income resulting from the abil-
ity to use previously contaminated land; reduction in time re-
quired to travel to markets and service centers due to use of 
more direct routes; and a reduced number of new mine vic-
tims. Given UNDP’s focus on marginalized populations, the 
team also sought to determine whether the benefits of demin-
ing were being captured by elites, for example with displace-
ment of poorer populations that previously had accepted risk 
and farmed or lived in hazardous areas.
The evaluation team identified these possible impacts, rec-
ognizing the gap between UNDP upstream activities and 
actual demining carried out by operators. UNDP support is 
usually several steps removed from direct impact on commu-
nities and can be considered effective to the extent its actions 
result in greater government focus, rule-setting, and man-
agement capacity. Respectively, these can positively affect 
the laws and procedures set in place for demining, prioritiza-
tion of areas for demining, and quality of demining results. 
Indeed, UNDP mine action support activities have many pos-
itive results: development of national statutes and demin-
ing strategies; trained deminers; stronger quality assurance; 
improved information management and greater understand-
ing of the landmine problem; more effective use of resources; 
less time spent on clearance of areas without mines; greater 
total areas cleared, etc. These are important results, yet the 
evaluation deliberately focused on downstream changes in 
the living conditions of the beneficiary population, and the 
team endeavored to find links between UNDP mine action 
work and perceived benefits to local communities.
Across the 24 communities visited in Laos, Mozambique, 
and Tajikistan, and based on evidence from interviews, focus 
group discussions, and documentary evidence, the main (per-
ceived) problems caused by mine/ERW contamination from 
the perspective of community members and local officials 
were
* The proximity of land contaminated with mines and 
ERW caused fear. People worried about themselves, 
their families (particularly children), livestock, and 
friends.
* Contamination interfered with freedom of movement, 
as mined roads affected the delivery of assistance and 
transport of goods, and contamination prevented chil-
dren from going to school on their own.
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* Contamination restricted access to natural resources, 
impeding the collection of firewood, mushrooms, me-
dicinal herbs, grass to make hay for animals in the win-
ter, and water for drinking and irrigation.
* Fear, restricted movement, and restricted access all led 
to reduced economic opportunity and well-being— 
especially for mine victims—with significant long-term 
repercussions, such as increased vulnerability and pov-
erty for those affected.
The principal impact on the community came from the 
broader sense of safety and ability to move freely throughout 
the area. When questioned about what had changed as a result 
of demining activity, local residents indicated they felt more 
secure and could “walk without fear.” In virtually all of the 
communities visited, the inhabitants (male and female) re-
ported significant safety improvements following clearance.
While community members believed that socioeconomic 
conditions at the community level had improved, the extent 
was highly variable and difficult to quantify. In most villag-
es visited, evidence indicated improved living standards as 
a result of the mine action effort. Community members ex-
pressed that they could resume their normal daily activities 
unimpeded, farming larger plots of land or existing plots 
more efficiently. Farmers, who previously worked contam-
inated fields cautiously, were able to dig deeper with their 
equipment and move faster across their land, accessing wa-
ter and other resources more easily. The observed economic 
improvements were primarily due to personal initiative rath-
er than specific economic development or job-creation assis-
tance from the government, the U.N. or NGOs to promote 
development following clearance.
Most community members who were interviewed report-
ed that besides immediate medical attention, no support was 
provided for mine survivors and their families. Community 
members stated that in the absence of victim support, the socio- 
economic conditions of mine survivors were consistently 
worse than they had been prior to the mine/ERW accident.
The evaluation did not find evidence that the release of pre-
viously contaminated land was a significant source of conflict. 
Although cleared land was generally put to use, it was not a 
new resource available for use by new claimants. In the coun-
tries visited, the families who traditionally used the land were 
known and continued to use the land before and after clear-
ance. Where this was not the case, there was an established 
Outcomes of the focus group discussion with beneficiaries on the impact of clearance, Asingtai (New) Village, Samouy District, 
Saravan Province, Laos.
Photo courtesy of UNDP/Paul Davis.
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procedure to allocate new land, which was applied to cleared 
land. Short of a land-reform process, the evidence suggests 
that clearance in these countries has not created a new asset 
to be distributed at the will of the government (or of any in-
ternational actor). Although respondents in all three of the 
countries visited were aware of disputes over land, none of 
them reported that these disputes were related to cleared land.
Conclusion
The transition to national ownership of mine action in 
some countries aided by UNDP has been slow and incon-
sistent, and the sustainability of some nationally managed 
programs remains in question. In two of the three case 
countries, the national mine action entity remained UNDP 
projects until recently, despite decades of UNDP capacity-
building support.
UNDP has sought to mainstream gender in its mine action 
programming, particularly through calling attention to the 
U.N. Gender Guidelines for Mine Action and seeking support 
of the Gender and Mine Action Program hosted by GICHD. 
Basic integration of gender in mine action is widely accepted 
(e.g., surveys of women as well as men for information on sus-
pected areas; relevance of sex disaggregated data on mine vic-
tims). Nonetheless, little evidence shows that UNDP support 
in this area has transformed national mine action programs, 
and further efforts to improve gender equity are required.
The livelihood improvements evident after demining in 
the observed communities stemmed mostly from local ini-
tiatives, enabled by reduced risk and improved access or by 
specific programs sponsored by UNDP and national gov-
ernment partners. As mine action programs mature, they 
tend to become increasingly focused on poor rural commu-
nities confronted by a wide array of development chal-
lenges. Economic development and job-creation programs 
would benefit from including the requirements of such 
mine affected communities. 
See endnotes page 67
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